Meeting blindly… Is Austrian economics useful for dynamic capabilities theory?  by Shastitko, Andrey & Golovanova, Svetlana
Russian Journal of Economics 2 (2016) 86–110
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com 
www.rujec.org
Meeting blindly… Is Austrian economics  
useful for dynamic capabilities theory? ً
Andrey Shastitko a,b,c,*, Svetlana Golovanova c
a Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
b Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow, Russia
c National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
Abstract
This paper relates competition studies and views on competition policy within Austrian 
economics to the dynamic capabilities theory. The idea of interacting research programs 
LQHFRQRPLFV LVXVHG WRSURYLGH WKHIUDPHIRU UHÀHFWLQJRQSDUWLFXODU LVVXHVRIFRPSH-
tition, on the one hand, and (1) ignorance, (2) knowledge (including tacit knowledge), 
(3) rationality, (4) equilibrium, (5) innovation, (6) entrepreneurship, and (7) monopoly, 
on the other hand. Unlike the majority of previous studies, these issues are discussed here 
mainly through the lens of new institutional economics. Williamson’s three-level scheme 
is used to explain opportunities and constraints for mutu ally enriching exchange of con-
cepts between different but close approaches in economic research. This paper shows that 
WKHUHDUHLPSRUWDQWLQWHUFRQQHFWLRQVDQGFRPSOHPHQWDULWLHVGHVSLWHVLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHV
LQREMHFWVRIVWXG\DQGZHDNPXWXDOÀRZVRILGHDVDQGFRQFHSWV
1RQSUR¿WSDUWQHUVKLS³9RSURV\(NRQRPLNL´+RVWLQJE\(OVHYLHU%9$OOULJKWV
reserved.
-(/FODVVL¿FDWLRQ%%//2
.H\ZRUGV competition, antitrust policy, entrepreneurship, dynamic capabilities, Austrian economics, 
new institutional economics, strategic management, sustainable competitive advantages.
1. Introduction
Unlike neoclassical economics (NCE), Austrian economics (AE) has elaborat-
ed a set of concepts that are quite akin to recent developments in strategic manage-
 ً 7KH SDSHU KDV EHQH¿WHG IURP GLVFXVVLRQV DW WKH WK &RQIHUHQFH RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 1HWZRUN IRU
(FRQRPLF0HWKRGRORJ\6W3HWHUVEXUJ0D\DQG&RQIHUHQFH³'\QDPLF&DSDELOLWLHVDQGWKH6XVWDLQDEOH
&RPSHWLWLYHQHVVRI)LUPVDQG1DWLRQV´6W3HWHUVEXUJ2FWREHU
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PHQWWKHRULHVDQGHYROXWLRQDU\DSSURDFKHVWR¿UPSHUIRUPDQFH7RVRPHH[WHQW
$( LV HYHQ FORVHU WR WKHG\QDPLF FDSDELOLWLHV WKHRU\ '&7²DFRQWHPSRUDU\
FRQFHSWLQVWUDWHJLFPDQDJHPHQW²WKDQVRPHFRQFHSWVZLWKLQQHZLQVWLWXWLRQDO
economics (NIE) and even transaction cost economics (TCE). This is true de-
VSLWHVLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHVSHFL¿FREMHFWRIVWXGLHVWKHPDUNHW$(DQG
WKH¿UP'&7$VWKH\DUHIRFXVHGRQGLIIHUHQWGLPHQVLRQVRIHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\
FRRUGLQDWLRQ WKHVFLHQWL¿F VFKRROV RIWHQPHHW ³WUDQVODWLRQ GLI¿FXOWLHV´ WKDW EH-
come barriers to interaction of research traditions both at the level of systemic ap-
proach (e.g., NCE, AE, NIE, TCE) and with regard to particular issues concerning 
economic analysis. What are the sources of the misunderstanding? Is it possible 
to mitigate at least a part of the problem? That is what we would like to discuss. 
7KHLQWHUSOD\RILGHDVEHWZHHQ$(DQG'&7LVYHU\IUDJPHQWHGDQGQRWDVZHOO
sustained as between AE and NIE. Some concepts are used in both theories (e.g., 
WDFLWNQRZOHGJHLQQRYDWLRQVDQGVRPHÀRZVRILGHDVDUHQRWZHOODUWLFXODWHGVXFK
as the functions of an entrepreneur. Among the rare exceptions it is worth mention-
ing several works by Kirsten and Nikolai Foss devoted to these issues (Foss and 
Foss, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2006). This fact would not be so important if it were not 
IRURQHFLUFXPVWDQFH¿UPV¶G\QDPLFFDSDELOLWLHVDUHQRWLQYDULDQWWRSURFHVVHVLQ
the environment, namely to competition, restrictions of competition and competi-
tion policy. At the same time, these processes, as innumerous studies show, are 
crucially important for both economic growth and economic development. 
7KHPDLQSXUSRVHRIWKLVSDSHULVWRLGHQWLI\RSSRUWXQLWLHVWRLQWHQVLI\WKHÀRZ
of ideas between theories in order to better understand practical aspects of inter-
actions between economic agents. This issue plays an important role in determin-
ing optimal competition policy design, in particular, and the potential engines of 
economic development, in general. From this perspective, the paper addresses 
WKHFODLPPDGHPRUHWKDQ\HDUVDJRE\2OLYHU:LOOLDPVRQ
³«ZKDW LVPLVVLQJLQEXVLQHVVVWUDWHJ\EXW LVGHVSHUDWHO\QHHGHG LVDFRUH
theory... the microanalytic, comparative institutional, economizing orientation 
of transaction cost economics deals with many of the key issues with which 
business strategy is or should be concerned... The economizing approach to 
VWUDWHJ\ VKRXOG ERWK FRQWULEXWH WR DQG EH WKHEHQH¿FLDU\ RI WKHVH GHYHORS-
PHQWVLQWKHQHZVFLHQFHRIRUJDQL]DWLRQ´
(Williamson, 1996, p. 321)
At the same time, as it will be demonstrated, AE concepts (especially re-
lated to competition issues) are very close in spirit to the analysis of dynamic 
capabilities and the search for sustainable competition advantages (SCA) of 
WKH¿UP²DOWKRXJK WKHUH LV FRQVLGHUDEOH FULWLFLVP RI$( FRPLQJ IURP1,(
This paper continues the line of work by Foss and Foss in interpreting the con-
cept of competition within the AE, the interrelation between competition and 
ignorance, knowledge (above all, tacit ), equilibrium, entrepreneurship, innova-
tions and monopoly. Special attention will be devoted to the understanding of 
antitrust policy in Austrian economics in the context of antitrust law evolution 
and the accumulation of experience in applying its provisions.
%HIRUHSURFHHGLQJLWLVQHFHVVDU\WRGHVFULEHWKHDVVXPSWLRQVOLPLWDWLRQVDQG
general framework of this study. 
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1. Point of view,QWKLVDUWLFOHZHGRQRWFRPSDUHZKHWKHULQGHSWKRUEULHÀ\
AE and other research traditions,1 neither do we perform a detailed analysis of 
internal discussions within AE on the issues mentioned above. In this paper, AE 
will be examined from the point of view of opponents rather than proponents. 
7R DQDO\]H$( IURP WKHRXWVLGH ZH VKDOO UHO\ SULPDULO\ RQ1,( VSHFL¿FDOO\
on the research tradition originating from Williamson’s works (which might be 
LGHQWL¿HGDVWUDQVDFWLRQFRVWHFRQRPLFV7&(:LOOLDPVRQ
0pQDUG$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRI'&7SUHVHQWHGLQVHYHUDO
recent studies will be  covered2²GHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDW$(GRHVQRWGHYHORSDV\V-
WHPDWL]HG WKHRU\ RI WKH³¿UP´3 XQOLNH H[SODQDWLRQRI WKH³PDUNHW´ZKLFK LV
WKHREMHFWRIVSHFLDODWWHQWLRQIRU'&7
2. Why was NIE rather than NCE chosen as a benchmark? There are at least 
three reasons. First, the opposition to NCE in AE has been pivotal to the position-
LQJRI$(RQWKH³PDUNHWRIHFRQRPLFFRQFHSWV´IRUWKHODVWVHYHUDOGHFDGHV)RU
this reason, AE has been compared to NCE many times and from a wide range 
RISHUVSHFWLYHV6HFRQG1,(SOD\VDUROHVLPLODUWR$(DVDVFKRROWKDW¿OOVLQ
the gaps and corrects some failures of the approach adopted within NCE. Third, 
1,(LVDQLPSRUWDQWVRXUFHRILGHDVIRU'&7DQGOLNHO\VHUYHVWRFRQGXFWVRPH
$(LGHDVWR'&7GXHWRWKHHODERUDWHGHOHPHQWVRIWKHFRQFHSWXDOFRUHRI1,(
3. Framework. The survey of AE concepts related to competition issues 
DQG OLQNHG ZLWK GLIIHUHQW DVSHFWV RI '&74 is organized within the context of 
:LOOLDPVRQ¶V WKUHHOHYHO VFKHPH NQRZQ DV ³LQGLYLGXDO±LQVWLWXWLRQDO DUUDQJH-
PHQWV±LQVWLWXWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQW´:LOOLDPVRQS
7KLVDUWLFOHLVVWUXFWXUHGDVIROORZV7KH¿UVWVHFWLRQLVGHYRWHGWRWKHZRUNLQJ
GH¿QLWLRQRIFRPSHWLWLRQZLWKLQ WKHFRQWH[WRI$(FRPSDUHG WRRWKHU UHVHDUFK
SURJUDPVDQG'&77KHQH[W WKUHH VHFWLRQVFRUUHVSRQG WR:LOOLDPVRQ¶V WKUHH
level scheme: the third section covers different aspects of individual choice LQ
the fourth section, we discuss economic exchange through different institution-
al arrangements²SULPDULO\PDUNHWV DQG¿UPV WKH¿IWK section is devoted to 
the institutional environmentDQGLWVLQÀXHQFHRQLQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVFRU-
responding to different options (mechanisms) of actors’ adaptation to changing 
circumstances. The sixth section presents a discussion of competition and com-
petition policy problems within the context of the theory of industrial organiza-
WLRQ,2DVWKHLPPHGLDWHWKHRUHWLFDOEDVLVIRUDQWLWUXVWSROLF\ZLWKVRPHTXHV-
WLRQVDGGUHVVHGWR'&77KHFRQFOXVLRQVIROORZ
2. Issues of competition study in AE: Context
$(LVDKHWHURGR[¿HOGRIUHVHDUFKWKDWIRFXVHVRQFRPSHWLWLRQDQGLWVUROHLQ
economic development. At the same time, this particular research program (in 
 1 )RUJHQHUDOUHYLHZVHHIRUH[DPSOH&DOGZHOODQG%RHKP9DXJKQ
 2 See also the special issue of Industrial and Corporate Change9RO1R
 3 6RPH WKHRULVWVXQGHUWDNH DWWHPSWV WR UHFRQVWUXFWZKDW WKH³$XVWULDQ WKHRU\RI WKH¿UP´FRXOG ORRN OLNH
VHHIRUH[DPSOH/DQJORLVZLWKRXWSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHSURJUDPRIWKHVWXG\LQDV\VWHPLFZD\
7KH\DUJXHWKDWLQVRPHSDSHUVLQWKH$XVWULDQWUDGLWLRQLWLVSRVVLEOHWR¿QGLGHDVWKDWFRXOGIRUPWKHFRUHRI
WKH³$(WKHRU\RID¿UP´LQFOXGLQJDGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHUROHRIHQWUHSUHQHXULDODFWLYLW\GHYHORSPHQWRIH[SHU-
WLVHDQGLQWURGXFWLRQRILQQRYDWLRQLQ¿UPJURZWK3HQURVH6DXWHW
 4 :HDUHVSHDNLQJDERXWWKH'\QDPLF&DSDELOLWLHV7KHRU\DIWHU%ULDQ/RDVE\ZKRLQIDFWLQVLVWVRQWKHSUH
VHQFHRIRUJDQL]DWLRQFUHDWLQJQRYHOW\DVWKHVXEMHFWPDWWHURIWKDWWKHRU\/RDVE\S
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WKH/DNDWRVLDQVHQVHVHH/DNDWRVFRQVLVWHQWO\DQGVWULFWO\FULWLFL]HVDQWL-
WUXVWSROLF\LQLWVHQWLUHW\$UPHQWDQR%RXGUHDX[DQG'L/RUHQ]R
'L/RUHQ]R5 unlike other theories that consider antitrust policy to be a set 
RIWRROVWRSURWHFWFRPSHWLWLRQ²HYHQWKRVHWKHRULHVWKDWPLJKWEHTXDOL¿HGDVDO-
lies of AE from the normative point of view (Chicago tradition). Another reason 
for turning to AE is the dissatisfaction of some economists with NCE as the ba-
VLV IRU DGGUHVVLQJ VSHFL¿FHFRQRPLFSUREOHPV LQFOXGLQJ WKHGHYHORSPHQW DQG
HQIRUFHPHQWRIDQWLWUXVWODZ7KLVGLVVDWLVIDFWLRQUHPDLQVGHVSLWHWKHVLJQL¿FDQW
PRGL¿FDWLRQRI1&(DVDUHVXOWRI³QHRFODVVLFDOHQYHORSLQJ´$YWRQRPRY
An additional reason to turn to the issues of competition and competition poli-
F\IURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRI/DNDWRVLDQUHVHDUFKSURJUDPVLQHFRQRPLFVLVWKHRQ-
JRLQJ GHEDWH RQ WKHJURXQGV DQG FRQVHTXHQFHV RI FRPSHWLWLRQ SROLF\ %DNHU
&UDQGDOODQG:LQVWRQZKLFKSOD\VDQ LPSRUWDQW UROH LQGH¿QLQJ
WKHFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVRI¿UPVWRLQFOXGHZD\VWRVXUYLYHDQGGHYHORSXQGHUWZR
types of challenges posed by (1) competitors and (2) regulatory authorities (in 
WKLVFDVH²DQWLWUXVWDJHQFLHV
Finally, AE elaborates and develops concepts that are very akin to recent de-
YHORSPHQWVLQVWUDWHJLFPDQDJHPHQWWKHRU\²LVVXHVRIVXVWDLQDEOHFRPSHWLWLYH
DGYDQWDJHV6&$RIWKH¿UPSDUWLFXODUO\WKRVHUHODWHGWRG\QDPLFFDSDELOLWLHV
.DWNDORS3LWHOLVDQG7HHFH.DWNDORHWDO$VZLOOEH
shown, AE complements the framework for dynamic capabilities drawn by other 
UHVHDUFKHUVDVFRPSRVHGRI7&(WKHEHKDYLRUDOWKHRU\RIWKH¿UPDQGHYROXWLRQ-
DU\HFRQRPLFV'XQQLQJDQG/XQGDQS1HYHUWKHOHVVRSSRUWXQLWLHV
for mutual enrichment of the theories evidently remain underexploited.
The Austrian concept of competition and its application in economic policy 
relies both on notions commonly accepted in economic theory, such as market, 
HTXLOLEULXP SUR¿W DQG VHDUFK IRU LQIRUPDWLRQ DQG RQ FRQFHSWVPRUH VSHFL¿F
IRU$(GLVFRYHU\LJQRUDQFHHQWUHSUHQHXUDQGNQRZOHGJH+RZHYHUWKHGLVWLQ-
JXLVKLQJIHDWXUHRI$(LVQRWRQO\WKHXVHRIVSHFL¿FWRROVEXWDOVRWKHVSHFL¿F
understanding of the concepts that are broadly used within the framework of 
RWKHUUHVHDUFKWUDGLWLRQV7KLVDSSOLHVERWKWR1&(DQG1,(/HWXVUHFDOOZLGHO\
NQRZQH[DPSOHV ³(TXLOLEULXP´ LQ WKHQHRFODVVLFDO YLVLRQ LV DVLWXDWLRQZKHUH
the parties to a transaction have no incentives to reconsider the choice made, 
whereas for representatives of the Austrian tradition, the main characteristic of 
equilibrium is taking full account of alternatives of using the available resources. 
2SSRUWXQLW\FRVWVLQWKH$XVWULDQVHQVHDUHVXEMHFWLYHE\GH¿QLWLRQDQGWKHUHIRUH
GLI¿FXOW WRFRPSDUH LQWHUSHUVRQDOO\ZKLOHXQGHU WKHQHRFODVVLFDODSSURDFKRS-
SRUWXQLW\FRVWV DUHREMHFWL¿HGDW WKHOHYHORI LQGLYLGXDO FKRLFH)URP WKLVSHU-
VSHFWLYHZHKDYHRQHPRUHDUJXPHQWWRORRNDW$(DVDVRXUFHIRU'&7ZKLFK
DFWXDOO\IDLOHGWR¿QG1&(DVFRXQWHUSDUW\IRULQWHOOHFWXDOH[FKDQJH$QRWKHUH[-
DPSOHLVWKDWDFFRUGLQJWR1&(WKH³HQWUHSUHQHXU´LVSUDFWLFDOO\QRGLIIHUHQWIURP
WKH³PDQDJHU´RUWKH³RZQHU´RIUHVRXUFHVZKLOHLQ$(LWLVWKHFHQWUDODFWRURI
WKHHFRQRPLFV\VWHPZLWKFRPSOLFDWHGUHODWLRQVWRIXQFWLRQVRIWKH³RZQHU´DQG
WKH³PDQDJHU´FUHDWLQJGLVFUHSDQFLHVHYHQZLWKLQ$(
Within the context of AE, competition (competitive order) is a process of dis-
covery of new opportunities to use known resources, which results from the en-
 5 See also http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv13n3/reg13n3-dilorenzo.html.
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WUHSUHQHXUV¶ WDNLQJDGYDQWDJHRI WKHLUDOHUWQHVVHGJH7KLVGH¿QLWLRQFRPELQHV
WZRFORVHO\LQWHUUHODWHGFRQFHSWVUHÀHFWLQJWKHYLHZVRIWKHIRXQGHUVRIFRQWHP-
SRUDU\$()ULHGULFKYRQ+D\HNDQG/XGZLJYRQ0LVHV²FRPSHWLWLRQDQGHQWUH-
SUHQHXUVKLS0LVHV+D\HN.LU]QHU²GHYHORSHGIXUWKHUE\
,VUDHO.LU]QHU'RPLQLFN$UPHQWDQR3HWHU%RHWWNH/XGZLJ/DFKPDQQ5LFKDUG
/DQJORLV*HUDOG2¶'ULVFROO0XUUH\5RWKEDUG-RVHSK6DOHUQRDQGRWKHUV
Proponents of AE see their main advantage over NCE in treating competition 
as a process rather than a condition or a result, both of which are static. The ap-
SURDFKWRGH¿QLQJFRPSHWLWLRQDVDSURFHVVHQYLVLRQVWKHQHHGIRUWKHVWULFWVHSD-
UDWLRQRIFRPSHWLWLRQUHVXOWVIURPLWVFRQGLWLRQV1&(GH¿QHVFRQGLWLRQVRIFRP-
petition as market characteristics (in terms of the number of sellers, entry and exit 
barriers, product differentiation, distribution of information, market concentration 
indicators), and results of competition as equilibrium prices and quantities sold. 
At the same time, as the neoclassical approach does not qualify modeled individ-
ual choice as a process, the distinction between conditions and results in research, 
based on the assumption of full rationality, is also relative. This is why AE quite 
reasonably considers competition in its neoclassical interpretation through equilib-
rium exclusively as a certain state of affairs (Amendola et al., 2003). 
%HLQJQHFHVVDU\DQGXVHIXOWKHZRUNLQJVLQJXODUGH¿QLWLRQRIFRPSHWLWLRQLV
DVVXFKWRWDOO\LQVXI¿FLHQWIRUSUHVHQWLQJWKHFRQFHSWRIFRPSHWLWLRQLQ$(IURP
WKHSHUVSHFWLYHQRWRQO\RI1,(EXWDOVRRI'&7&RQFOXGLQJWKLVVHFWLRQOHWXV
PHQWLRQWKDWWKHVLQJXODUGH¿QLWLRQRIFRPSHWLWLRQZLWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRI$(
implicitly contains some aspects determining the program of further presenta-
tion: the way this process is connected to knowledge and ignorance, rationality 
of choice and tacit knowledge, equilibrium (lack of equilibrium) and monopoly, 
WKHIXQFWLRQRIDQHQWUHSUHQHXUDQGWKHUHVXOWRILWVIXO¿OOPHQW
3. Competition in the context of individual choice
3.1. Competition, ignorance, and knowledge
7KHIXQGDPHQWDOUROHRINQRZOHGJHLQ$(H[SODLQVWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHDWWULEXWHG
WRWKHXVHRINQRZOHGJHLQVRFLHW\E\+D\HN$FFRUGLQJWR
+D\HN WKHLPSRUWDQFHRINQRZOHGJHVWHPVIURPWKHIDFW WKDW LWVDFFXPXODWLRQ
in the process of receiving information and its subsequent use enables actors 
WRDGDSW WRFRQVWDQWO\FKDQJLQJFLUFXPVWDQFHVDQG WR¿QGRSSRUWXQLWLHV WRXVH
scarce resources, both of which constitute important characteristics of the market 
SURFHVV7KHPRUHHI¿FLHQWO\YDOXDEOHNQRZOHGJH LVXVHG WKHEHWWHU HFRQRPLF
entities’ private plans and actions can be coordinated, and the better results of 
economic performance and development can be achieved.
$FFRUGLQJ WR +D\HN NQRZOHGJH LV LQFRPSOHWH IRU HYHU\ HFRQRPLF HQWLW\
The statement complies with the provision concerning the ignorance of actors and 
partially the thesis of bounded rationality within the context of NIE. The down-
side of the problem of using knowledge in society is the high methodological 
status of the concept of ignorance within the AE. 
Ignorance means a decision-maker lacks knowledge of circumstances and op-
portunities that matter from the point of view of attaining his goals, even if that 
person tries to make rational (reasonable) decisions. A process of movement from 
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ignorance to knowledge about new opportunities that enable the creation of new 
value is an important element of competition.
&RQYHUVHO\ WKLV SURFHVV LV DQHFHVVDU\ FRQGLWLRQ WR SURYLGH ¿UPV¶ FRPSHWL-
WLYHQHVV+RZHYHUXQOLNH WKH³LJQRUDQFH±NQRZOHGJH´ LVVXH IURP WKHLQGLYLGXDO
FKRLFH SHUVSHFWLYH'&7 LQ IDFW DGGUHVVHV WKHLVVXH RI FROOHFWLYH DFWLRQVZLWKLQ
D¿UPZLWKPXOWLOHYHOURXWLQHV7KLVPHDQVWKH³LJQRUDQFH±NQRZOHGJH´LQGLYLGX-
DOFKRLFHLVDEXLOGLQJEORFNIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQVRQWKH¿UPOHYHO
Changing the borderline between knowledge and ignorance for actors is an es-
VHQWLDOIHDWXUHRIFRPSHWLWLRQ7KHDFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRIWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIVXFK
a borderline within the context of individual behavior is a characteristic of AE, 
but without an accent on collective actions based on mechanisms of coordination 
WKDWDUHDOWHUQDWLYHWRWKHPHFKDQLVPVRISULFHV²DQLGHDZKLFKLVFOHDUO\ERU-
rowed from TCE. 
The distinction between knowledge and lack of knowledge is also present in 
the economics of information based on maintaining the optimization logic of in-
GLYLGXDOFKRLFH+RZHYHUXQOLNH$(LQHFRQRPLFVRILQIRUPDWLRQWKHUHVRXUFHV
used to receive knowledge have an opportunity cost (Stigler, 1961). The process 
of obtaining information is similar to other types of production processes and 
never involves unexpectedness (surprises). 
Thus, discovery as the conceptual core of the competitive process for AE is 
something between the results of systematic search, when an economic entity 
obtains the ex ante ODFNLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQDQGZLQGIDOOSUR¿W WKDWGLGQRW UHTXLUH
a display of features characteristic for an entrepreneur (Kirzner, 1997, p. 72). 
The obtaining and use of information on new opportunities through organizational 
performance is a process that has a similar nature to the one described by Kirzner 
with one important detail: this information is a result of coordinated efforts of 
individuals within a mechanism of governance alternative to the market (in this 
case — hierarchy), which also might be interpreted in terms of dynamic capabili-
ties or meta-routines =ROORDQG:LQWHU'\QDPLFFDSDELOLWLHV IROORZLQJ
/RDVE\  SS ± FRQWDLQ WZR VHWV RI FKDUDFWHULVWLFV  JHQHULF
WKHSRWHQWLDOWRGHOLYHUFRQVLVWHQWSHUIRUPDQFHZLWKLQDVSHFL¿HG¿HOGE\UHSHDW-
HGDSSOLFDWLRQRIHVWDEOLVKHGSDWWHUQVRIEHKDYLRUDQGVSHFL¿FDOO\G\QDPLF
capabilities that allow performance to be changed either in response to changed 
circumstances or to the exploitation of new ideas. According to Winter (Winter, 
2003), dynamic capabilities are the second (higher) order capabilities that pre-
VXSSRVH WKHDELOLW\ RI WKH¿UP WR UHDOL]H 6FKXPSHWHULDQ LQQRYDWLRQV$VSHFLDO
feature of dynamic capabilities is the combination of frequent organizational ac-
WLRQVURXWLQHVRU³EHVWSUDFWLFHV´XQOLNHDGKRFLPSURYLVDWLRQVVHH'XQQLQJDQG
/XQGDQSS±DQGWKHXQLTXHQHVVRIFKDQJHGFRQGLWLRQV
A similar problem arises in connection with modeling based on the assump-
tion of information asymmetry, which is crucial for the principal-agent literature. 
The principal may be unaware of the characteristics of a particular agent that are 
important for the former, but at the same time, according to basic agency mod-
els, there is information concerning the characteristics of the distribution of dif-
ferent types of agents on a certain market. A proponent of AE would agree that 
the principal is unaware of the intrinsic characteristics of a particular agent and 
RIJRRGVDQGVHUYLFHVSURYLGHGE\WKLVDJHQW+RZHYHUKHVKHZRXOGDGGWKDW
the principal does not have knowledge about the distribution of agents between 
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their different types either, or even about the very set of possible types of agents 
(at least ex ante). This is especially important for the case of multiple valuable 
characteristics of agents and of goods and services to be provided by them that 
remain hidden from the principal.
With respect to product markets, ignorance actually means the existence of op-
SRUWXQLWLHVWRJDLQHFRQRPLFSUR¿WWKDWUHPDLQWHPSRUDULO\XQQRWLFHGE\SDUWLFL-
pants in economic exchanges.6 A lack of ignorance is equivalent to a lack of oppor-
tunities not only for discovery but also for ranking alternatives by a decision-maker. 
This is why in a situation of full awareness by participants in economic exchanges, 
competition as a process becomes impossible. Moreover, it is the same reason why 
the subject matter (i.e., dynamic capabilities as sources of SCA) evaporates. 
The concept of ignorance of the present but hidden (unperceivable but detect-
able as a result of the entrepreneur’s actions, or exploitation of dynamic capabili-
WLHVLQ'&7DVDQH[SHFWHGEXWXQVSHFL¿HGex ante result) opportunities is supple-
mented in the Austrian tradition with ignorance in time. It is a lack of knowledge 
about the consequences of the actions of the decision-maker within the context of 
simultaneous activities of many other people atomistically adapting to changing 
circumstances. From this perspective, ignorance is closely connected with unpre-
dictable and unexpected results of competition. 
It is important to emphasize that unpredictability of the future may be quite 
H[SHFWHGDQGDSSDUHQWWRWKHDFWRUV+RZHYHUWKHQHRFODVVLFDOPRGHORIVHDUFK
IRULQIRUPDWLRQGRHVQRWDWDOO¿WLQWRWKHORJLFRI$(RU'&7EHFDXVHLQWKH1&(
an agent compares the costs of search and acquisition of information, on the one 
KDQGDQG WKHDQWLFLSDWHGEHQH¿WIURPWKHXVHRI WKLV LQIRUPDWLRQRQ WKHRWKHU
KDQG+RZHYHUWKHVHFRQVLGHUDWLRQVKDUGO\FRYHUDOORIWKHUHOHYDQWLVVXHV
,WPD\VHHPWKDWWKHIRUPXODWLRQRIWKHSUREOHPRILJQRUDQFHRIWKH³$XVWULDQ
LQGLYLGXDO´KDVEHHQZHOOGHVFULEHGLQWHUPVRIXQFHUWDLQW\LQWKHPRGHOVRILQ-
GLYLGXDOFKRLFHZKLFKDUHDPRQJ WKHPRVWZHOOGHYHORSHG LQ1&(+RZHYHU
WKLV LV RQO\ WKH ¿UVW LPSUHVVLRQ 7KHDVVXPSWLRQV XVHG LQ WKHVH PRGHOV DUH
criticized (including behavioral economics research by Kahnemann, Tversky, 
'HOOD9LJQDDQGRWKHUVVHH3HVHQGRUIHU/HWLJQRUDQFHFRUUHVSRQGWRXQ-
certainty according to Knight (1921), rather than hazard with a known objective 
probability of the onset of different versions of future events. In reality, however, 
LJQRUDQFHGRHVQRWERLOGRZQWRXQFHUWDLQW\WKLVLVWUXHQRWRQO\LQWKHWUDGLWLRQDO
neoclassical sense of the word, but even in terms of parametric uncertainty, which 
Knight presented as the true uncertainty whereby the set of elementary events is 
FRPSOHWHEXWLGHQWL¿DEOHSUREDELOLWLHVDUHRQO\VXEMHFWLYH
8QFHUWDLQW\LQ$ȿPHDQVWKDWHOHPHQWDU\HYHQWVDUHXQVSHFL¿HGex ante and it 
is therefore impossible to estimate the value of investments in obtaining reliable 
information. This is a characteristic of structural uncertainty /DQJORLV
within the frames of which a decision-maker can see and, hence, specify only 
SDUWRIWKHSUREDEOHRXWFRPHVWKHUHVWRIWKHPIDOOLQWRWKHFDWHJRU\RIVWUDWHJLF
VXUSULVHV7KHRSSRUWXQLW\ WR UHDFW SURDFWLYHO\RQXQVSHFL¿HGex ante changes 
LQFLUFXPVWDQFHVLVDPRQJWKHNH\EXLOGLQJEORFNVRI'&7DVDQH[SODQDWLRQRI
SCA in a permanently changing environment with various types of shocks.
 6 7KH\PLJKWVXVSHFWWKDWWKHUHDUHVRPHRSSRUWXQLWLHVEXWEHFDXVHRIWKHODFNRIVSHFL¿FDWLRQWKHVHRSSRU-
tunities remain unexploited.
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An actor may acknowledge that events he/she is unaware of may take place in 
WKHIXWXUH0RUHRYHUWKHVHHYHQWVPLJKWKDYHDVLJQL¿FDQWLPSDFWRQRSSRUWXQL-
ties to attain his/her goals. This is why the characteristics of individual behav-
LRU²LQDGGLWLRQWRUDWLRQDOLW\DQGLJQRUDQFH²DOVRLQFOXGHOHDUQLQJDQG¿QDOO\
adjustment (by incorporating recent experience in initial plans). 
To draw a line: according to AE, competition is a process of moving the border-
OLQHEHWZHHQLJQRUDQFHDQGNQRZOHGJHEXWQHLWKHUWKHFRVWVQRUWKHEHQH¿WVQRU
the very moment of acquiring knowledge, can be evaluated ex ante and hence can-
not be an object of rational choice (in the sense this concept is interpreted by NCE).
The ex post study of behavior and exchange results only creates the veil of cer-
WDLQW\ZKLFKPLJKWFUHDWHVLJQL¿FDQWULVNVRIHUURUVLQGHFLVLRQPDNLQJLIDSSOLHG
to the normative area. Regarding antitrust policy, it is related to risks of type 
I errors: accusation and prosecution of an innocent actor by imputing to him an 
awareness of processes that ex ante were (ineradicably) unexpected. Regarding 
strategic management issues it might provide false ground for an ad hoc reac-
tion to a particular event without a broader context of the issue: development of 
SURDFWLYHDGDSWLQJ¿UPV¶FDSDELOLWLHV'&7FRQWDLQVWKHLPSRUWDQWLGHDWKDW6&$
LVDFRQVHTXHQFHRIV\VWHPLFDQG¿UPVSHFL¿FG\QDPLFFDSDELOLWLHVWKDWDUHQRW
ready to be substituted for perfect forecasts (as it is implicitly supposed).
3.2. Competition and rationality
Rationality is a fundamental concept in economics. It establishes correspondence 
between an actor’s goals and the means of their attainment (Robbins, 1935, p. 16). 
'HVSLWHWKHVLPSOLFLW\RIWKHGH¿QLWLRQWKHXVHRIWKLVFRQFHSWLVUHODWHGWRDQXP-
EHURIPHWKRGRORJLFDOSUREOHPV,WLVVXI¿FLHQWWRQRWHWKHYDULHW\RIIRUPVRIUDWLR-
QDOLW\LQFOXGLQJLWVFODVVL¿FDWLRQLQWRIXQFWLRQDODQGLQVWUXPHQWDOIXOOYDULDEOHDQG
ERXQGHGSURFHGXUDODQGVXEVWDQWLYHUDWLRQDOLW\ȺYWRQRPRY6LPRQ
The traditional concept of rationality of choice within the frames of NCE is 
based on the optimization technique applied in economics where subjective crite-
ria of rational choice are not essential. From this viewpoint, rationality is instru-
mental. Competition might be considered as a set of conditions and as a result 
in conjunction with instrumental rationality. Thus, instrumentality of rationality 
makes redundant the attempts to disclose the nature of competition as a process, 
if it does not rule them out completely. 
According to AE, human rationality cannot be regarded in terms of optimiza-
tion because inseparable elements of the optimization task are formed in the pro-
cess of the market’s functioning. To understand the nature of competition within 
WKHFRQWH[WRIWKH$XVWULDQDSSURDFKLWLVLQVXI¿FLHQWWRFKDQJHWKHDVVXPSWLRQRI
IXOOUDWLRQDOLW\IRUWKHDVVXPSWLRQRIERXQGHGUDWLRQDOLW\DVLQ7&(2ISDUDPRXQW
importance is the decision-maker’s ignorance of various circumstances that mat-
ter for the purpose of attaining his goals. Moreover, a person’s ignorance can also 
be the result of a rational (but not necessarily maximizing) choice. Meanwhile, 
the relationship between competition and rationality in AE is far from being as 
trivial as it seems in the context of competition models constituting the elements 
of the theory of price. In fact, if competition is weak, participants’ decisions are 
QRW WDNHQDW WKHERXQGDU\RIRSSRUWXQLWLHV²ERWK WHFKQRORJLFDO DQGDOORFDWLYH
HJQRWDOOFRVWVDYLQJRSSRUWXQLWLHVDUHXVHGDFFRUGLQJWR/HLEHQVWHLQ¶V
94 $6KDVWLWNR6*RORYDQRYD5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
;HI¿FLHQF\FRQFHSW7KLVFDQEHH[SODLQHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWWKHSURFHVVRIGHFL-
sion-making is not free of charge and errors, on the one hand, and that it requires 
time and rather serious emotional tension, on the other hand. Thus, a lack of com-
petition correlates with the slack in behavior in search of opportunities to create 
value/ minimize cost as a way to provide SCA. At the same time, the limited op-
portunities for imitation are actually a condition for rent appropriation (ex post), 
on the one hand, and are incentives to develop capabilities (ex ante) (Kay, 2010, 
p. 1210), on the other.
At the same time, the intensity of competition may limit the opportunities for 
reasoning due to an increase in opportunity cost of each section of time as a frame 
IRUGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ,QRWKHUZRUGVWLPHVSHFL¿FLW\RIGHFLVLRQVLVRQHVRXUFHRI
SUR¿WWKDWLVXQOLNHZDJHDQGLQWHUHVWLQDQ³HYHQO\URWDWLQJHFRQRP\´5RWKEDUG
2009, p. 511). This in turn leads to a substitution of rational decision-making 
by intuitive decision-making. Using the comparative analysis of cognitive sys-
tems suggested by Kahneman (2003), the latter, in addition to offering concep-
WXDO SUHVHQWDWLRQ DQG FRGL¿FDWLRQ RI RSSRUWXQLWLHVPD\ EH HYHQ IDVWHU DQG LQ
many cases may require less effort. This is a possible direct effect of competition. 
+RZHYHUFRPSHWLWLRQPD\KDYHDQDGYHUVHHIIHFWFRQQHFWHGZLWKWKHH[WHQVLRQ
of opportunities for reasoning on the basis of development and application of 
special techniques and algorithms of decision-making. In some sense, the exten-
sion of the sphere of rational decisions by adding intuitive decisions conforms to 
WKHFRQFHSWRI³SURFHGXUDOUDWLRQDOLW\´LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKZKLFKDOJRULWKPL]HG
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJDQGDFWLRQVVXEVWLWXWHGLVFUHWLRQDORQHV$¿UP¶VG\QDPLFFDSD-
ELOLWLHV²XQOLNHWKRVHRIDSHUVRQ²FRPELQHSDUDOOHOUDWLRQDOGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ
within a particular framework without excluding intuition. 
At the same time, from the point of view of the result, decisions might actu-
DOO\EHTXDOL¿HGDVUDWLRQDOHYHQLIWKHLUDGRSWLRQLQYROYHVDODUJHVKDUHRILQWX-
LWLRQ,QWKLVVHQVHUDWLRQDOLW\EHFRPHVDV\QRQ\PIRUHI¿FLHQF\RUWKHFKRLFH
RSWLPDOLW\ERWKIRUWKHLQGLYLGXDODQGWKH¿UP<HWVLWXDWLRQVDUHSRVVLEOHZKHUH
UHDVRQLVQRWXVHGRULVXVHGLQVXI¿FLHQWO\QRWEHFDXVHRIODFNRItime, but be-
cause of lack of incentives for identifying and comparing resource-available 
alternatives. A considerable share of such situations is associated with external 
competitive constraints for market players. Competition involves more rational 
DFWLRQVGH¿QHGLQWHUPVRIUHVXOWValthough there is no clear mutual consistency 
between the strength of competition and reasoning behind the market players’ 
actions. This conclusion is closer to AE, which follows the logic of organic ra-
tionality, or rationality of the process (Williamson, 1985), which is actively ex-
plored by evolutionary theory. Thus, mechanisms balancing individual intuition, 
on the one hand, and individual and collective reasoning, on the other, look like 
engines for revealing new opportunities as a source of SCA. 
The concept of awareness and rationality plays an important role in antitrust 
policy. The conceptual basis of antitrust policy presumes that the market players 
restricting competition can anticipate the effect of their actions. Moreover, other 
market players are assumed to be capable of identifying the actions of competitors 
and counterparties and their impact on the terms of their own decisions. Therefore, 
other market participants can evaluate the extent of the impact of counterparties’ 
and competitors’ actions on the competitive environment. Evidently, this concept 
is completely unacceptable for AE. It may also seem ambiguous from the point 
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RIYLHZRI1,(+RZHYHU1,(XQOLNH$(GRHVQRWFRQVLGHUWKHEDWWOHIRUPDUNHW
players’ opportunities for rational decision-making hopelessly lost. 
In this connection, the assessment of competition advocacy is relevant as 
DVSHFL¿F FRPSRQHQW RI DQWLWUXVW SROLF\7KHPDLQSXUSRVHRI FRPSHWLWLRQ DG-
vocacy is to promote ideas and values of competition in society and convincing 
PDUNHWSOD\HUVWKDWDFWLYHFRPSHWLWLRQEHQH¿WVWKHPFRPSDUHGWRHQIRUFLQJRI
competition by legal rules. 
The reason for advocacy in the framework of NCE is unclear. Assuming that 
economic entities are capable of evaluating their potential gains from alterna-
tive versions of the market structure, expenses of competition advocacy seem to 
be an embezzlement of resources. Regarding NIE, competition advocacy seems 
quite reasonable, since informing market participants reduces enforcement costs. 
The idea of competition advocacy might seem to be close to AE, given that the pa-
SHUVE\+D\HNDQG0LVHVDUHDWUXHK\PQWRWKHFRPSHWLWLYHRUGHU+RZHYHU$(
does not support competition advocacy, albeit for different reasons than their 
colleagues’ abiding principles of NCE. From the perspective of AE, arguments 
IDYRULQJFRPSHWLWLRQPD\RQO\EHSDUWRIDSROLF\RIPDQLSXODWLRQEXWE\GH¿QL-
tion, cannot be an element of informing market participants.
The skepticism of Austrians concerns not only antitrust policy but also compe-
tition policy in general. In contrast to NCE models that proceed from the assump-
tion that all market participants are aware of the possible gains and losses in any 
state of the world, AE argues that no one can know about these gains and losses, 
including the corresponding state agency. In this context, judgment regarding 
a preferential market status is not possible, nor are evaluative judgments con-
cerning the market structure and the actions of its participants. It is very impor-
WDQWWRVWUHVVWKDWZHPLJKW¿QGVWURQJVHSDUDWLRQRIPDUNHWFRQFHQWUDWLRQLVVXHV
from competition within the AE research tradition (Mund, 1933). This idea was 
DOVRVXSSRUWHGE\WKHPDLQVWUHDP,2VHYHUDOGHFDGHVODWHUZKHQWKHSUHYLRXVO\
GRPLQDQW XQLGLUHFWLRQDO DSSURDFK ZLWKLQ ³VWUXFWXUH±FRQGXFW±SHUIRUPDQFH´
SDUDGLJPZKHQFRQFHQWUDWLRQZDVWKRXJKWWRLQÀXHQFHFRPSHWLWLRQEXWQRWYLFH
versa) was revised.
3.3. Competition, innovation and entrepreneurship
7KH¿JXUHRIDQHQWUHSUHQHXU LQHFRQRPLFV LVSHUKDSVRQHRI WKHPRVWDP-
bivalent and ambiguous. It arouses the greatest level of discord among repre-
sentatives of different traditions in economic research. This becomes particu-
larly clear when comparing the concept of an entrepreneur with actors such as 
consumers and owners of resources. It is not accidental that standard economics 
textbooks seldom contain systematic presentations of the theory of entrepreneur-
ship. This is even the case for AE, where Kirznerian concept of the entrepreneur 
is criticized by his colleagues for the erroneous separation of entrepreneur and 
RZQHU ZKLOH RWKHU$( SURSRQHQWV 5RWKEDUG 6DOHUQR DSSHDO WR ³RQHVLGHG
FRPSOHPHQWDULW\´7KLVYLVLRQPLJKWEHIRXQGLQYRQ0LVHV¶VWKHRU\RIHQWUH-
preneurship, which argues that an entrepreneur is always a capital owner but not 
HYHU\RZQHULVDQHQWUHSUHQHXU5RWKEDUGS6DOHUQR:LWKRXW
delving into a review of entrepreneurship theories and their variations within 
$(ZH¿QGLWQHFHVVDU\WRKLJKOLJKWVRPHDVSHFWVLPSRUWDQWIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
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the concept of entrepreneurship in the context of competition studies in AE that 
DUHDSSOLFDEOHIRU'&7
First, although Kirzner argues that the entrepreneurial function is not logical-
ly connected with property rights to assets, de-facto one-sided complemen tarity 
KLJKOLJKWVWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHQRWRQO\RIWKHLQFHQWLYHVIRUDSSURSULDWLQJSUR¿WEXW
also of the readiness to bear the burden of risks of losses in case of failure. This 
LGHD LV LPSRUWDQW IRU G\QDPLF FDSDELOLWLHV RI WKH¿UP WKDW FRQIURQWV QRW RQO\
WKHXQFHUWDLQEHQH¿WVEXWDOVRSUREDEOHORVVHVDVDOORFDWLRQRISURSHUW\ULJKWVLV
important in order for the decision-maker to make what are likely to be painful 
decisions.
Second, the entrepreneur’s function might be explained in terms of arbitrage 
(spatial and inter-temporal) due to discovery of new opportunities for coordinat-
ing the individual plans of market players. Within this context the concept of an 
entrepreneur is close to the concept of arbitrage, which is easily compatible with 
NCE. In fact, there are usually sellers on the market who sell products that are un-
derpriced or overpriced, and buyers who are ready to pay higher or lower prices 
IRUWKHVHSURGXFWV+RZHYHUEX\HUVUHDG\WRSD\KLJKHUSULFHVPD\EHXQDZDUH
that the same product can be purchased at a lower price, and the sellers offering 
the product at a lower price may be unaware that someone was ready to purchase 
WKHLUSURGXFWDWDKLJKHUSULFH2EWDLQLQJDQGSURFHVVLQJWKLVW\SHRILQIRUPDWLRQ
may be too expensive, but not for all market players. 
The entrepreneurial function consists in identifying such buyers and sell-
HUV EHDUHUV RI LQGLYLGXDO SODQV DQGPDNLQJ DSUR¿WZLWKRXW YLRODWLQJ WKHLQ-
terests of each of the actors, which constitutes a necessary condition for volun-
WDU\H[FKDQJH+RZHYHUWKLVKDVDVSLOORYHUHIIHFWLQWKHIRUPRIWUDQVODWLRQRI
 economically important information by the entrepreneur to other market players 
concerning the existing opportunities to use the assets at their disposal and, cor-
respondingly their value.
&RQVHTXHQWO\LIDOORSSRUWXQLWLHVDUHUHÀHFWHGLQWKHSULFHVZKLFKKDSSHQVLQ
DVLWXDWLRQRI3DUHWRHI¿FLHQWHTXLOLEULXPVSDFHIRUH[HUFLVLQJWKHHQWUHSUHQHXU-
ial function disappears, as does the possibility of generating entrepreneurial prof-
it. In this sense, there is an insurmountable contradiction between the neoclassi-
cal model of general equilibrium and the concept of entrepreneurship in AE. 
'\QDPLFFDSDELOLWLHVDVDVRXUFHRI6&$DUH LQ WXUQ WKHRXWFRPHRI LQVWLWX-
tional entrepreneurial activity, including organizational innovations. At the same 
time, as it might be supposed, dynamic capabilities providing SCA are not invari-
ant to the particular institutional environment including the mode of enforcement 
RIDQWLWUXVWQRUPV7KDWLVZK\VLJQL¿FDQWFKDQJHVLQWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOHQYLURQ-
PHQWPLJKWUHTXLUHFKDQJLQJVRPHG\QDPLFFDSDELOLWLHVRIWKH¿UVWW\SHJHQHULF
E\XVLQJG\QDPLFFDSDELOLWLHVRIWKHVHFRQGW\SHVSHFL¿FDOO\G\QDPLF,QDQ\
case, however, these changes are costly and time consuming. Moreover, there are 
some grounds to doubt the substitutability of the two types of capabilities. This 
means that entrepreneurial activity aimed at SCA is also differentiated where two 
types of dynamic capabilities are concerned. 
Third, entrepreneurs are people who can quite easily be analytically singled 
RXWIURPDPXOWLWXGHRIHFRQRPLFDJHQWVEXWDUHPXFKPRUHGLI¿FXOWWRLGHQWLI\
empirically (Salerno, 2008). This is connected with the fact that being a member 
of a group of managers, workers, landowners, consumers and owners of capital 
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does not make a person an entrepreneur. For this, he/she should display his/her 
RZQDOHUWQHVV LQ¿QGLQJ DQGXVLQJSUHYLRXVO\KLGGHQRSSRUWXQLWLHV WRXVHXQ-
derpriced assets. In the extent to which actors cope with this task, they might be 
TXDOL¿HGDVHQWUHSUHQHXUV7KDWLVZK\G\QDPLFFDSDELOLWLHVDUHFUXFLDOO\GHSHQ-
GHQWRQIXO¿OOPHQWRIHQWUHSUHQHXULDOIXQFWLRQ
Fourth, people have different attitudes, including the ability to notice this 
VRUWRIRSSRUWXQLW\2QWKHRQHKDQGWKHUHDUHLQFHQWLYHVIRUGHWHFWLQJWKHPRQ
WKHRWKHUKDQGIDUIURPHYHU\RQHDFWXDOO\JDLQVWKLVSUR¿W7KHUHLVDGDQJHURI
sustaining net losses as a consequence of an error resulting from excess decisive-
QHVVVHOIFRQ¿GHQFHDVLVNQRZQIRUPEHKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLFVOLWHUDWXUH,QWKLV
VHQVHGLIIHUHQWOHYHOVRIDZDUHQHVVRIPDUNHWSOD\HUVUHÀHFWDGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQRI
focus (or perceptiveness, according to Kirzner). The origin of this differentiation 
of focus as a person’s ability to notice opportunities is a separate issue. It is impor-
WDQWWRHPSKDVL]HWKDWDVHWRIDOWHUQDWLYHVDVDFHUWDLQ³PHQX´LVQRWIUHHRIFKDUJH
LQWKHFRRUGLQDWHJULGV\VWHPRILQGLYLGXDOFKRLFHZKLFKHQYLVLRQVWKHLGHQWL¿FD-
tion of entrepreneurs among the entire multitude of economic agents.
Entrepreneurs have an advantage in identifying hidden opportunities and there-
fore shift the system of economic exchange toward equilibrium in the sense that, 
ceteris paribus, the system of prices provides a more complete account of the set 
of resources and the multitude of alternative options for their use if external shocks 
do not move the system away from equilibrium proxy. In this sense, the very 
generation of hidden opportunities remains beyond the realms of focus of AE to 
the extent that the processes of changing preferences, available production tech-
nologies, as well as set and quantity of available resources are not being taken into 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQ2QHFUXFLDOSRLQWQRWRQO\IRUWKHYLVLRQRIFRPSHWLWLRQDQGHQWUH-
preneurship but also for policy issues is the inappropriateness of the representative 
PDUNHWDFWRUFRQFHSW7KLVSRLQWLVTXLWHVLPLODUWR'&7EDVHGRQIRXUIHDWXUHVRI
resources, namely, valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (Katkalo et al., 
2010, p. 1175), because it presupposes the uniqueness of resources. 
'LVFORVLQJhidden opportunities can be closely connected with the creation 
of new opportunities, which are largely described in terms of Schumpeter’s 
(1912/1934) theory of economic development, but are quite suitable for purposes 
RIH[SODLQLQJWKHEDVLVRI$(6SHFL¿FDOO\RUJDQL]DWLRQDOLQQRYDWLRQVHQDEOLQJ
UHVRXUFHV WREH UHFRPELQHG WR LQFUHDVH WKHHI¿FLHQF\SURGXFWLYHQHVVRI WKHLU
use may at the same time lead to restrictions of competition from the point of 
view of the antitrust authorities and the court, even though they are nothing other 
than manifestations of entrepreneurship and, hence, competition. In this connec-
tion, an exhaustive (closed) list of prohibited forms of economic organization 
(contracting) enables type I errors to be minimized, thereby outlawing such ac-
tions and agreements of a market player that do not restrict competition in reality 
-RVNRZ6KDVWLWNR
6SHFL¿FDOO\ LPSRVLQJ UHVWULFWLRQVRQ VHOOLQJSURGXFWVRI DFRPSHWLQJEUDQG
might be regarded as an institutional arrangement in the form of a vertical re-
VWUDLQWZKLFKDOORZVHI¿FLHQF\WREHUDLVHGE\SURYLGLQJKLJKHUTXDOLW\VHUYLFHV
DW WKHVDPH SULFHV+RZHYHU XQOLNH WKH&KLFDJR WUDGLWLRQ RI UHVHDUFK RI QRQ
standard commercial practices or the tradition of NIE, which identify both nega-
tive and positive effects of this sort of restrictions, AE has not developed its own 
DSSURDFKHV2Q WKHZKROH WKLV LV H[SODLQHGE\ WKHJHQHUDOO\ VNHSWLFDO DWWLWXGH
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towards antitrust policy as a set of instruments for improving the market’s perfor-
PDQFH²DQGKHQFHWRZDUGVWKHQHHGWRLPSURYHLWVWRROV:KDWLVWKHSRVLWLRQ-
LQJRI'&7ZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHVHDUFKRI6&$WDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWFDSDELOL-
ties related to the practices mentioned above?
For AE, the discharge of the entrepreneurial function is the driving force of 
HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW DVZHOO DV WKHZD\ WR SURYLGH 6&$ LQ'7& FRQWH[W
In principle, it does not raise the issue of a possible negative impact of entre-
preneurship on welfare. For NCE, on the contrary, such a view of the issue has 
long been traditional, especially when the point is entrepreneurship under condi-
WLRQVRIVLJQL¿FDQWPDUNHWSRZHU6XFKGLIIHUHQFHLQLQWHUSUHWLQJWKHUROHRIHQ-
WUHSUHQHXUVKLSLVUHÀHFWHGQRWRQO\LQWKHPHWKRGRORJLFDOVWDWXVRIWKHFRQFHSWV
RI FRPSHWLWLRQ DQGPRQRSRO\ EXW DOVR LQ WKHQRUPDWLYH FRPSRQHQW²WKHEHVW
policy design with respect to competition.
4. Competition in the context of interaction between market players
4.1. Competition and market equilibrium
Following the logic of AE, competition is a process that exists only in a dis-
equilibrium economic system in the sense that not all options for using resources 
DUHUHÀHFWHGLQWKHV\VWHPRISULFHVDQGWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQWLQHFRQRPLFDJHQWV¶
plans. This is the case irrespective of some disputes within AE on the meth-
odological status of the equilibrium concept (see, for example, discussions of 
.LU]QHUDQG/DFKPDQQDQGIROORZHUVUHODWHGWRWKHLVVXHRIZKHWKHUWKHPDUNHW
SURFHVVLVLQKHUHQWO\HTXLOLEUDWLQJ².LU]QHU¶VRSLQLRQ²RUZKHWKHULWVSHUIRU-
mance generates disequilibration).
Economic agents’ plans and expectations are only partially compatible, which 
becomes clear at the moment they start interacting with each other. This is why 
long-term equilibrium on the market of perfect competition was regarded by 
Austrian economists as a contradictio in adjecto. Nash equilibrium as one of 
the main tools of competitive analysis in contemporary microeconomics seems to 
EHDVLPLODUDOWKRXJKOHVVREYLRXVFRQWUDGLFWLRQ,IWKHUHZHUHQRSUR¿WDEOHVKLIW
from the selected strategy, given a particular strategy of another party, to another 
strategy or party of strategic interaction, economic development would stop.
The methodological status of market equilibrium in AE has an important 
characteristic. Equilibrium is not a starting point in explaining the functioning 
RI WKHPDUNHW XVLQJ WKHPHWKRG RI FRPSDUDWLYH VWDWLFV HYHQ IURPYHU\ ³1&(
like’ AE of Kirzner. The result achievable with different levels of probability and 
proximity reduces the ignorance of market players (zero ignorance is an equilib-
rium correlative) (Kirzner, 1997, p. 62). The parameters regarded by NCE as an 
essential element of equilibrium turn out not to be even a result in AE, but rather 
a direction of changes on the market explained by the actions of the market ac-
tors. According to AE, a market process takes place only when the results differ 
from expectations. This compels market actors to adjust expectations and deci-
sions in the next period and change the mode of actions. This sort of adjustment 
is made in the form of revision of the opportunities set open (visible and attain-
able) to decision-makers. As a result of such revisions, some opportunities turn 
out to be phantoms and others overlooked.
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The very discovery of this sort of opportunity is closely connected with the in-
terests of actors, since it is their individually assessed opportunities, rather than 
the opportunities of society as a whole. In addition, the revision of opportunities 
LVDLPHGDWLQFUHDVLQJSULYDWHQHWEHQH¿WVWKXVFRQVLVWHQWO\DSSURDFKLQJWKH³SRV-
VLELOLWLHVIURQWLHU´IRUSUR¿WDEOHEXVLQHVVDFWLYLW\+RZHYHUVXFKDUHVXOWLVSRV-
sible in the case of offering more attractive conditions to partners in the market 
process and outdistancing one’s competitors.
If equilibrium is achieved, plans and expectations are compatible, the market 
players are not being offered more attractive alternatives which were unnoticed 
before. It means that competition has stopped being an active force. It corre-
VSRQGVWRLQWHUQDOFRQWUDGLFWLRQLQWKH$UURZ±'HEUHXPRGHOUHFRJQL]HGE\)UDQN
+DKQDQGVWUHVVHGRQFHDJDLQE\%ULDQ/RDVE\S6LQFHWKHLQWHU
temporal equilibrium is derived by collapsing the future into the present, there 
can be no need for any further decisions. 
Equilibrium accounts for the side effects and unforeseen results of interactions 
of entities acting in their own interests. It is impossible to plan this result due to 
the ignorance of the decision makers for whom the discovery of new opportuni-
ties is a surprise in the sense that none of the participants can specify the param-
HWHUVRIWKH³VXUSULVH´ex ante.
Explaining the obtained results ex post is the most that can be achieved. This 
feature of equilibrium is a basis for far-reaching conclusions regarding economic 
policy in the sphere of competition protection with important backward implica-
WLRQVIRU¿UPV¶6&$VSHFL¿FLW\DQGUHODWHGG\QDPLFFDSDELOLWLHV,WLVQRWHZRUWK\
that AE is close to NIE regarding this matter. The fewer elements of so-called 
hybrid models that NIE models contain (i.e., assumptions of full and bounded 
rationality, zero and positive transaction costs in different dimensions of eco-
nomic exchanges are combined), the farther away they are from the orthodox 
methods of NCE and the less these structures rely on the concept of equilibrium 
and the more they rely on descriptions of characteristics of coordination mecha-
nisms. It is not accidental that comparative analysis of governance mechanisms 
is the core of the methodology in the TCE. The key problem here is combining 
the incentives design with the development of mechanisms of economic agents’ 
adaptation to changing circumstances (Williamson, 1985, 1996).
7KHPDUNHWFRQGLWLRQVDUHFKDQJLQJXQGHUFRPSHWLWLRQ6SHFL¿FDOO\SURGXF-
tion (transformation and transaction) costs change connected with the restruc-
turing of production capacities demonstrates the difference of competition as 
a state of affairs determined in terms of equilibrium and competition as dis-
equilibrium. Within such a formulation of the problem, the number of market 
SOD\HUVKDVQRVLJQL¿FDQFHIRUHYDOXDWLQJWKHLQWHQVLW\RIFRPSHWLWLRQZKLFK
LV LQ FRQWUDVWZLWK WKH+DUYDUG UHVHDUFK WUDGLWLRQ EHJLQQLQJ LQ WKHPLGGOH RI
the XX century.
&RPSHWLWLRQ GH¿QHG LQ WHUPV RIPDUNHW HTXLOLEULXP LV FORVHO\ OLQNHGZLWK
the problems of the market structure. Paradoxical as it may seem, in this matter, 
$(GRHVQRWFULWLFL]HWKHQHRFODVVLFDOPDLQVWUHDPEXWUDWKHUWKH+DUYDUGVFKRRO
ZKLFKLVIDUOHVVFRQQHFWHGZLWKLW7KHHDUO\+DUYDUGVFKRROWKDWZRUNHGZLWKLQ
WKHSURJUDP ³VWUXFWXUH±FRQGXFW±SHUIRUPDQFH´ UHJDUGHG WKHHTXLOLEULXP FKDU-
acteristics as a result of a certain market structure. This particular program was 
the main object of AE criticism. 
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The modern theory of industrial organization has long stopped supporting 
the postulate of unilateral dependence: the market structure determines conduct 
and thus the characteristics of results (prices, quantity, welfare effects). Models 
where the market structure is being formed under the impact of decisions of 
its participants, including strategic interaction as it is presented within game-
theoretic framework, had become much more widespread several decades ago. 
This particular approach is closest to the Austrian concept of competition as 
DSURFHVV7KHSDUDPHWHUVWKDWZHUHTXDOL¿HGE\WKH³VWUXFWXUH±FRQGXFW±SHUIRU-
PDQFH´UHVHDUFKSURJUDPDVH[RJHQRXVWXUQRXWWREHWKHUHVXOWVRIWKHDFWLRQV
of the market players, e.g., production costs related to the employed technologies 
and forms of economic organization used.
Turning to competition policy issues from the perspectives of equilibrium 
and SCA the following should be stressed: actions, namely antitrust enforce-
ment, aimed at the establishment and control of economic activity parameters 
that are largely a result of entrepreneurial activity have a negative impact on en-
trepreneurship, weakening and distorting incentives. Some of these consequenc-
es are (1) the mutation of SCA, (2) the weakening value creation activity and 
(3) the strengthening SCA in redistribution or rent-seeking.
Therefore, competition in AE is possible only in a situation of market disequi-
librium. Fixing an equilibrium is equivalent to the absence of competition. This 
is what hinders dialogue between AE and researchers using competition models 
that constitute the conceptual basis of competition policy. In these models, Nash 
equilibrium and similar instruments are crucial for positive analysis and norma-
tive conclusions.
4.2. Competition and monopoly
The interplay of competition with other important analytical elements of AE 
provides a key to understanding the radical contradiction between AE and NCE 
on the issue of monopoly.
From the Austrian position, a market process exists as long as there is freedom 
RIVDOHDQGSXUFKDVHEDVHGRQVSHFL¿HGDQGSURWHFWHGSURSHUW\ULJKWVDQGDPDUNHW
process means competition. In this context a monopoly examined in economics as 
a special market structure is a myth because even a monopolist in the neoclassical 
sense of the word encounters the need to reveal hidden opportunities that are not re-
ÀHFWHGLQFXUUHQWSULFHVDVDPHDQVRIEDODQFLQJWKHPDUNHW.LU]QHUS
This does not mean that monopoly does not deserve Austrians’ attention. 
Monopoly is the opposite of competition, which is what underlies the approach to 
GH¿QLQJPRQRSRO\DQGWRPDNLQJUHOHYDQWQRUPDWLYHFRQFOXVLRQVE\WKH$XVWULDQ
school. Competition is a process in which economic agents (entrepreneurs) offer 
more appealing alternatives to their counteragents, whereas the restriction of this 
sort of opportunity is none other than monopoly. This is why the main source of 
man-made monopoly is the government, which restricts the choice of alternatives 
by means of regulation (Armentano 1999, p. 96).
+RZHYHU WKHLPSRVVLELOLW\ RI OHJLWLPL]LQJ SULYDWH PRQRSRO\ RQ WKH¿QDO
product market does not mean the impossibility of legitimizing private monopoly 
in principle. The distinction between the monopoly of a manufacturer as a prod-
uct (service) producer and the monopoly of a manufacturer as a resource owner 
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is of principal importance to AE. This distinction is largely manifested in nor-
mative evaluations of two types of analytical elements. The element of resource 
monopoly is legitimate whereas the product monopoly (naturally, on an unregu-
lated market ) is a myth. For example, this myth is close to Rothbard’s skepticism 
WRZDUGVFDUWHOV¶²WKHPRVWGDQJHURXVDQWLWUXVWODZYLRODWLRQV²LQVWDELOLW\
³«DFDUWHOLVDQLQKHUHQWO\XQVWDEOHIRUPRIRSHUDWLRQ,IWKHMRLQWSRROLQJRI
DVVHWVLQDFRPPRQFDXVHSURYHVLQWKHORQJUXQWREHSUR¿WDEOHIRUHDFKRI
the individual members of the cartel, then they will act formally to merge into 
RQHODUJH¿UP7KHFDUWHOWKHQGLVDSSHDUVLQWKHPHUJHU2QWKHRWKHUKDQGLI
WKHMRLQWDFWLRQSURYHVXQSUR¿WDEOHIRURQHRUPRUHPHPEHUVWKHGLVVDWLV¿HG
¿UPRU¿UPVZLOOEUHDNDZD\IURPWKHFDUWHODQGDVZHVKDOOVHHDQ\VXFKLQ-
dependent action almost always destroys the cartel. The cartel form, therefore, 
LVERXQGWREHKLJKO\HYDQHVFHQWDQGXQVWDEOH´
(Rothbard, 2009, p. 651)
Remarkably, these ideas correspond to the so-called hostile tradition in antitrust 
described by Williamson (1985). 
Exclusive control over a resource without which production of a certain set 
RIJRRGVDQGVHUYLFHVLVLPSRVVLEOHFUHDWHVRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUJHQHUDWLRQRISUR¿W
WKDWLVPRQRSROLVWLFUDWKHUWKDQHQWUHSUHQHXULDO,QWHUPVRI'&7LWLVDVSHFL¿F
5LFDUGLDQUHQWUDWKHUWKDQD6FKXPSHWHULDQUHQW8QOLNHPRQRSROLVWLFSUR¿WHQ-
WUHSUHQHXULDOSUR¿W LVXQVWDEOHDQG WUDQVLHQW*DLQLQJ LW UHTXLUHVSHUPDQHQWHI-
forts aimed at identifying and creating new opportunities and combinations of 
resources to make the outcomes more appealing for counterparties seeking for 
dynamic capabilities to provide SCA within the context of value creation.
,WLVPXFKPRUHGLI¿FXOWWRHVWDEOLVKDGLDORJXHZLWKUHVSHFWWRQDWXUDOPRQRS-
olistic activity in regulated sectors. From the perspective of AE, the very concept 
of an economic basis for identifying a natural monopolistic activity is erroneous 
'L/RUHQ]R7KHUHJLPHRIQDWXUDOPRQRSRO\LVDUHVXOWRIFROOXVLRQEH-
WZHHQWKHJRYHUQPHQWDQGFRPSDQLHVWKDWKDYHVDFUL¿FHGWKHULJKWWRIUHHSULF-
ing in exchange for a guarantee of entry restriction and compensation for losses, 
LQFOXGLQJ QRUPDO SUR¿W$W WKLV SRLQW WKHSRVLWLRQV RI$( DQG UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV
RIWKHHFRQRPLFWKHRU\RIUHJXODWLRQGLIIHUTXLWHVLJQL¿FDQWO\(YHQDWWHPSWVWR
introduce competition to natural monopolistic markets requiring a radical reform 
of the regulation regime are seen by representatives of AE strictly negatively as 
addressing problems by inappropriate methods.
7KHUHIRUH WKHPDLQ VSHFL¿F IHDWXUH RI$( IRU HVWDEOLVKLQJ LQWHUUHODWLRQEH-
tween competition and monopoly consists in the fact that AE sees the source of 
monopoly in circumstances which are external with respect to market perfor-
PDQFHgovernment interventions, exclusive and monopolistic rights to natural 
resources essential for the production of relevant goods and services. Free market 
is considered competitive by nature. From this point of view, the concept of pri-
vate monopoly as a source of loss of public welfare is groundless, as is the theory 
of market failures.
,Q$(ZHPLJKW¿QGVRPHVRUWRI WKHRUHPVRQSULYDWHO\LQGXFHGPRQRSRO\
in contrast with the state-induced one. The key element of proof is presented by 
Rothbard:
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³:K\KDVKH>SURGXFHU@EHHQDEOHWRH[WUDFWD³PRQRSRO\SULFH´WKURXJKUH-
VWULFWLQJKLVSURGXFWLRQ"2QO\EHFDXVHWKHGHPDQGIRUKLVVHUYLFHVHLWKHUGL-
rectly by consumers or indirectly from them through lower-order producers) 
is inelastic, so that a decreased production of the good and a higher price will 
lead to increased expenditure on his product and therefore increased income 
IRUKLP<HWWKLVLQHODVWLFGHPDQGVFKHGXOHLVSXUHO\WKHUHVXOWRIWKHYROXQWDU\
demands of the consumers. If the consumers were really angry at this ‘mo-
nopolistic action’, they could easily make their demand curves elastic by boy-
cotting the producer and/or by increasing their demands at the ‘competitive’ 
SURGXFWLRQOHYHO7KHIDFWWKDWWKH\GRQRWGRVRVLJQL¿HVWKHLUVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWK
the existing state of affairs and demonstrates that they, as well as the producer, 
EHQH¿WIURPWKHUHVXOWLQJYROXQWDU\H[FKDQJHV´
(Rothbard, 2009, p. 634)
There are at least three ways to criticize this point of view from the perspec-
tives of different approaches. 
First, NCE: the monopoly price appears on the elastic segment of market de-
mand in terms of the standard of elasticity estimates adopted.
Second, NIE: obvious problems of collective action and the free-rider problem 
are omitted, assuming that consumers are aware of the consequences of practices 
implemented by the producer.
Third, behavioral economics: it is not always clear whether the producer ex-
SORLWV FRQVXPHUV GLVWULEXWLQJ SDUW RI WKHSRWHQWLDO EHQH¿W LQ KLV RZQ IDYRU DW
the expense of consumers.
5. Antitrust policy
Normative applications of the concepts developed within AE, including 
the concept of competition, are one of the most important and at the same time 
most sensitive issues closely related to practical problems in searching for 
¿UPV¶6&$$(KDVDOZD\VEHHQLQRSSRVLWLRQWR1&(DVDUHVHDUFKSURJUDPLQ
economics on virtually all key problems of economic policy, especially com-
SHWLWLRQSROLF\LUUHVSHFWLYHRIZKHWKHUWKH+DUYDUG&KLFDJRRUSRVW&KLFDJR
LQÀXHQFHG E\1,( DSSURDFK WR VWXG\LQJ FRPSHWLWLRQ SUHYDLOHG1RUPDWLYH
FRQFOXVLRQRQDQWLWUXVWSROLF\ZRXOGEHVXPPDUL]HGYHU\EULHÀ\DV³DEROLVK
DQWLWUXVW´
7KHDXWKRUVRI WKH$XVWULDQ VFKRRO LQSDUWLFXODUQHJDWLYHO\DVVHVV WKHHI¿-
ciency of antitrust policy in terms of fostering competition as a vehicle of eco-
nomic development. This is partially connected with the contradiction between 
the fundamental concepts of the two schools and partially with a simple lack of 
mutual understanding. Proponents of AE believed that all designs in the devel-
opment of antitrust policy measures proceed from the model of perfect competi-
tion7 while there were at least two waves of antirust reshaping in the 1970s and 
 7 See, e.g., Kirzner (1997, p. 94). Such an evaluation prompts the question of whether what was said is merely 
DFRQVHTXHQFHRIVHULRXVGLI¿FXOWLHVLQWUDQVODWLRQLQDEURDGVHQVHRIWKHZRUGEHWZHHQFRPSHWLQJUHVHDUFK
programs, or that contemporary models can actually be reduced to basic elements of the model of perfect com-
petition.
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1990s. In reality, the overwhelming majority of economists who do not agree 
with AE postulates would join the idea that the theory of perfect competition as 
D³EODFNERDUGWKHRU\´DWWKHPRPHQWKDVQRGLUHFWUHODWLRQWRWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\
antitrust policy.
According to AE, antitrust policy as a system of rules (exclusions of contract 
freedom principle) and enforcement mechanisms is based on the erroneous in-
terpretation of the nature of competition or on government actions distorting 
the competitive environment. Such evaluation of antitrust policy foundations by 
AE does not leave much room to discuss the differences in interpretation of direc-
tions or spheres of application of antitrust policy methods. 
All of these are regarded by AE as harmful for competition. For example , 
a selective antitrust ban on mergers is interpreted as a restriction of entrepre-
QHXULDODFWLYLW\DQG LV WKHUHIRUHTXDOL¿HGDVDQDQWLFRPSHWLWLYHDFWLRQ irres-
pec tive RI WKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI DVSHFL¿FPHUJHU RU DI¿OLDWLRQ DQG SRVVLEOH
LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU WKHUHOHYDQWPDUNHWV .LU]QHUS5RWKEDUG
p. 643–644). 
The ban (or even structural and behavioral remedies) on cartel agreements 
LV HYDOXDWHG OLNHZLVH /HW XV GHPRQVWUDWH$XVWULDQV¶ HYDOXDWLRQ RI WKHEDQ RQ
DJUHHPHQWVDQGVDQFWLRQVRQWKHLUSDUWLFLSDQWVXVLQJDFRQFUHWHH[DPSOH2QHRI
WKHPRVWZLGHO\NQRZQDQWLWUXVWFDVHVRIWKHSDVWGHFDGHVLVWKHFDVHRIWKH³YL-
WDPLQFDUWHO´(LJKWRIWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVWPDQXIDFWXUHUVRIYLWDPLQVZHUHFROOHF-
tively penalized for price collusion in an amount exceeding 800 million euros.8 
AE regards this decision as one of many failures of antitrust regulation, because it 
ZDVLVVXHGRQWKHEDVLVRIDQXQMXVWL¿HGDVVXPSWLRQRIRYHUSULFLQJZKHUHDVLWLV
impossible to estimate the level of prices that could have been formed on the tar-
get market of vitamins without collusion. Intervention by antitrust authorities is 
interpreted as a violation of the principle of freedom of contract. The enforced 
leniency program seems to be nothing but a tool of unfair competition and a way 
WR³SXOOWKHUXJRXWIURPXQGHU¶DFRPSHWLWRU.LP
7KLVLVZK\LQWKLVFDVHWKHUHLVQRVXI¿FLHQWUHDVRQWRH[DPLQHWKHGLIIHUHQFHV
in the ideas of AE, for example with respect to vertical restraints, tacit collu-
VLRQRUPHUJHUFRQWUROWKDWFRXOGEHFRPHDVXEMHFWRIFRPSDULVRQWRWKH+DUYDUG
&KLFDJRDQG3RVW&KLFDJRDSSURDFKHVLQWKHWKHRU\RI,2RUWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRI
WKHVHDFWLRQVIURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRI'&7
The notion of market failures is the conceptual core of the discussion about 
the foundations and instruments of antitrust policy in the context of the inter-
acting and competing research traditions.9 The idea of market failures10 con-
tradicts the AE approach, whereas in NCE they have been regarded as grounds 
for govern ment interventions in economic exchanges since the works of Arthur 
Pigou, while for NIE government intervention is one of possible remedies for 
market failures but not necessary a better one. In this sense, a compromise be-
tween AE, NIE and NCE concerning the antitrust policy possibilities and frame-
work seems quite unlikely.
 8 The review of this case see, e.g., in: Aubert et al. (2006, p. 1242).
 9 A critical review of the relationship between antitrust policy and market failures, and their compensation 
methods, is presented in Meese (2005).
 10 (VSHFLDOO\UHPHGLDEOHE\WKHVWDWHDFWLYLVPLQDQ\DFWLYHIRUP²UHJXODWLRQDQG³WKHVWDWHHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS´
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Evidently, not only the practice but also the principles of antitrust policy may 
VHHP DPELYDOHQW 2QH RI WKHPRVW FRPSOLFDWHG PHWKRGRORJLFDO DQG SUDFWLFDO
problems is a (theoretically rather trivial) conceptual separation of the protection 
RIFRPSHWLWLRQIURPWKHSURWHFWLRQRIFRPSHWLWRUV7KHWKHVLV³&RPSHWLWLRQSROL-
F\VKRXOGSURWHFWFRPSHWLWLRQUDWKHUWKDQFRPSHWLWRUV´LVZHOONQRZQDPRQJUH-
searchers and politicians. Its implementation implies that antitrust policy should 
not be used as a tool by groups of special interests in pursuing their goals (as an 
LQVWUXPHQWRIXQIDLUFRPSHWLWLRQ+RZHYHUWRZKDWH[WHQWPLJKWWKLVSULQFLSOH
be implemented in practice? In addition to any other policy envisioning the set-
ting of rules and enforcement mechanisms, the antitrust policy has certain dis-
tributive implications that might be interpreted (at least ex post) as protection of 
particular groups of market players (including competitors).
According to the logic of the Austrian approach, special protection of com-
petition by the government leads to competition restriction, i.e., the opposite re-
sult. This argument is used to draw a general conceptual conclusion that antitrust 
policy is not needed for rectifying the market operation.
Unlike the problem of antitrust legislation as a whole, the comparison of dif-
ferent schools’ conceptions of particular antitrust policy tools has a certain per-
spective. A comparison of AE and NIE research traditions (with respect to TCE) 
shows contrasting attitudes to the rule of reason vs. per se rule in antitrust. 
/HWXVUHFDOOWKDWWKHSHUVHUXOHPHDQVWKHVXI¿FLHQF\RIHVWDEOLVKLQJFRQIRU-
mance of activities or agreements to those prohibited by law. If such conformance 
is established, they are recognized as guilty of violating antitrust law. The rule of 
reason, on the contrary, allows the restriction of competition if such practice re-
VXOWVLQFRQVXPHUEHQH¿WVDQGLIWKHRYHUDOOHIIHFWIRUWKHEXVLQHVVSUDFWLFHLVSRVL
WLYH'UDZLQJDGHPDUFDWLRQOLQHEHWZHHQWKHWZRUXOHVGHSHQGVRQWKHUHOLDELOLW\
RI WKHLQIRUPDWLRQRQ WKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIEHQH¿WVDQG ORVVHVDQGRQ WKHRYHUDOO
gains from the use of various forms of restricting agreements. Applying the rule 
RIUHDVRQLVMXVWL¿HGRQO\LIZHEHOLHYHLQWKHDELOLW\WRHYDOXDWHWKHJDLQVIURP
the adopted commercial practice. 
The problem of ignorance is expressly raised both in the frames of AE and 
7&(+RZHYHU$XVWULDQVDYRLGLGHQWLI\LQJDQLGHDORXWFRPHRIWKHPDUNHWSUR-
cess for principled reasons of its unpredictability. In contrast, the approach based 
on Williamson’s work does not rule out identifying an ideal outcome, although 
it questions the possibility and necessity of taking this outcome into account 
ZKLOHIRUPXODWLQJSROLF\ IRU WKHUHDOZRUOG 9RLJWSDVZHOODV LQ
evaluating organizational performance. 
+HUHZHPLJKWIRUPXODWHVRPHYHU\SUDFWLFDOLPSOLFDWLRQVIRU'&7)LUPV¶
SCA might depend on economic concepts that in fact stand behind some economic 
policy instruments’ design and their implementation. Regarding antitrust policy, 
LWEHFRPHVDFKDOOHQJHWRFUHDWH¿UPVSHFL¿FFDSDELOLWLHVWRPLQLPL]HWKHULVNV
RIDQWLWUXVWSURVHFXWLRQ7KHH[DPSOHLVDQWLWUXVWFRPSOLDQFHSROLF\%HLQJDSDUW
and parcel of the business model it refers to the requirements of the regulatory 
HQYLURQPHQWDQGJXLGHVLQWHUDFWLRQVZLWKDQWLWUXVWDXWKRULW\+RZHYHUWKHVHFD-
pabilities might be not only value creating but also value (re)distributing. This is 
why managing antitrust risks does not necessarily mean value-creating activity 
E\¿UPVRQWKHPDUNHWWDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWRSSRUWXQLWLHVWRUHDFKSULYDWHJRDOV
using antitrust agency as a tool. These worries come directly from AE.
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6. AE and policy implications of the theory of industrial organization: 
Questions for DCT
The practice of antitrust law enforcement, starting at least from the second half 
of the 20th century, relies more or less on the concepts developed by economic 
theory. It has been mentioned by Richard Posner:
³/RRNLQJRYHUWKHHQWLUHKLVWRU\RI86DQWLWUXVWODZ,FRQFOXGHWKDWWKHPRVW
powerful explanatory variable is simply the state of economic opinion. 
Antitrust doctrine has changed more or less in tandem with changes in eco-
QRPLFWKHRU\WKRXJKRIWHQZLWKDODJ´
(Posner, 2001, p. 286)
This is particularly visible in the United States, where the dominance of 
WKH+DUYDUGVFKRROLQWKHVWXGLHVRIFRPSHWLWLRQDQGDQWLWUXVWSROLF\LVVXHVGXU-
LQJ WKHV±VZDV IROORZHG ¿UVW E\ WKH&KLFDJR WUDGLWLRQ DQG ODWHU DW
the turn of the 21st century, the Chicago tradition was gradually displaced by 
Post-Chicago concepts based on considerably wider involvement of NIE con-
cepts. The concepts of the market, competition, and the role of antitrust policy, 
ZKLFKDUHDOWHUQDWLYHWR$(XQGHUZHQWVLJQL¿FDQWFKDQJHV11 
7KH+DUYDUGVFKRROLVFRQVLGHUHGWREHWKHVWDUWLQJSRLQWIRUGHYHORSPHQWRI
the contemporary competition theory inherited primarily from Joan Robinson and 
(GZDUG&KDPEHUOLQ LQ WKHV:LWKLQ WKHFRQWH[WRI WKH+DUYDUGDSSURDFK
major market participants were recognized as admittedly being motivated to re-
VWULFWFRPSHWLWLRQ7KHGRPLQDQFHRIWKH+DUYDUGVFKRROLQLQWHUSUHWLQJWKHFRQ-
duct of market players conforms to the dominance of the per se rule in antitrust 
enforcement. These ideas have been refuted based on a set of empirical tests. 
,WZDV RQH RI WKHNH\ IDFWRUV UHPRYLQJ WKH³VWUXFWXUH±FRQGXFW±SHUIRUPDQFH´
approach from the foreground of industry studies.
'XULQJ WKH¿UVWGHFDGHVRI DQWLWUXVW ODZ WKHEHJLQQLQJRI WKHth century), 
DKLJKPDUNHWVKDUHZDVVRPHWLPHVFRQVLGHUHGWRSURYLGHDVXI¿FLHQWEDVLVIRU
WKHTXDOL¿FDWLRQRIPRQRSROLVWLFSRZHUDQGIRUWKLVSRZHUDVEHLQJLOOHJDO$WOHDVW
VRPHFRXUWGHFLVLRQVHJ1RUWKHUQ6HFXULWLHV6WDQGDUG2LOLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
in the early 20th century suggest the prevalence of this approach (Armentano, 
1999). Arguments favoring the actions of companies with a high market share 
were simply disregarded by the courts (Piriano, 2007), probably due to populist 
responses to the fear of large companies. In the 1930s, some researchers sought 
to prove the idea of much more complex relations between market concentration 
DQGPDUNHWFRQGXFW9HUQRQ0XQGEXWWKH\IDLOHGWRRXWSHUIRUPWKHOHDGHUVRI
WKHLURSSRQHQWV²(GZDUG&KDPEHUOLQDQG-RDQ5RELQVRQ6DOHUQR
,Q WKH V WKH +DUYDUG DSSURDFK FDPH XQGHU VHYHUH FULWLFLVP IURP
the Chicago school. Many concepts of the Chicago school relied on two common 
SUHVXPSWLRQVODUJHFRPSDQLHVDQGDFWLRQVWUDGLWLRQDOO\TXDOL¿HGDVUHVWULF-
WLRQVRIFRPSHWLWLRQPD\OHDGWRHI¿FLHQF\LQFUHDVHVPDQ\DFWLRQVYLHZHG
 11 :HGRQRWDQDO\]HLQGHWDLOWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI,2RUWKHFRQWHQWVRIGLVFXVVLRQVEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWVFKRROV
GLUHFWO\UHODWHGWRDQWLWUXVW7KLVLVVXHZDVH[DPLQHGE\6FKPDOHQVHHLQDSDSHUGHYRWHGWR,2HYROXWLRQ
in the 20th and early 21st centuries.
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as tools to restrict competition (above all, vertical restraints) in reality may have 
no such implications. It is up to special analysis in each particular case to estab-
lish any negative consequences (rule of reason instead of per se rule). Within 
the framework of this particular period application of the rule of reason was obvi-
ously rapidly increasing. 
The use of the Chicago school as a conceptual basis for antitrust law enforce-
PHQW KDG WZR W\SHV RI LPSOLFDWLRQV2Q WKHRQH KDQG SDUWLFXODU GHFLVLRQV RQ
antitrust law enforcement became more substantiated from the economic point of 
YLHZ2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHGHWHUULQJHIIHFWRIWKHDQWLWUXVWODZEHFDPHZHDN-
er due to possible lowering of the predictability of its enforcement under weak 
standards of economic analysis. This means that SCA probably does not include 
multi-level complex capabilities that provide strong compliance with antitrust 
ODZUHTXLUHPHQWV+RZHYHUZKDWUHTXLUHPHQWVFRXOGEHPDGHIRU6&$LIWKHUH
was no clear content of antitrust bans and standards to prove guilt or innocence 
and, consequently, no clear boundary between zero sanctions and multimillion-
GROODUHTXLYDOHQW¿QHVRUHYHQLPSULVRQPHQWIRUFRPSDQ\RI¿FLDOV"2QHSRVVLEOH
JXHVVLVDVLWXDWLRQVSHFL¿FG\QDPLFFDSDELOLW\WRPDQDJHEXVLQHVVWREXVLQHVV
and business-to-government relations to mitigate the antitrust risks mentioned.
At the same time, it is quite indicative that despite a considerably lower level 
of assumed antitrust intervention, the Chicago school approach was also heavily 
FULWLFL]HG IURP WKHSHUVSHFWLYH RI$( DV ZHOO DV IURP WKH+DUYDUG DSSURDFK
5LFKDUG3RVQHUDQG5REHUW%RUNZHUHVHYHUHO\FULWLFL]HGIRUWKHLULQFRQVLVWHQF\
to protect market institutions. From the perspective of the Austrian school, those 
DXWKRUV¶SRVLWLRQVSHFL¿FDOO\LQWKHVSKHUHRIDQWLWUXVWSROLF\FRQWUDGLFWHGWKHLU
SRVLWLRQLQRWKHU¿HOGV%ORFN$(FRQVLGHUVDQWLWUXVWSROLF\UHGXQGDQW
ZKLOHWKH&KLFDJRDSSURDFKPHUHO\SRLQWVWRWKHQHHGIRUPRUHSUHFLVHTXDOL¿FD-
tion of the market players’ practice in concrete cases.
From the Austrians’ point of view, even though the Chicago approach uses an ex-
SODQDWLRQRIWKHPDUNHWRSHUDWLRQWKDWFRPSHWHVZLWKWKH+DUYDUGUHVHDUFKWUDGLWLRQ
LQ,2LWEDVLFDOO\VWD\VZLWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRIWKHVDPHZRUNLQJPRGHORILQGL-
vidual choice, and consequently, of interactions. The most vivid example is the opti-
mism of the Chicago school with respect to contestable markets, where the absence 
RIHQWU\EDUULHUVGRHVQRWDOORZDQLQFXPEHQW¿UPWRJHQHUDWHSUR¿WRQWKHPDUNHW
even if there are no opportunities at each given moment for loss-free functioning of 
WZRRUPRUH¿UPVRQWKHVDPHPDUNHWFRQGLWLRQRIFRVWVVXEDGGLWLYLW\
The Post-Chicago approach seems to be even less acceptable for AE. This ap-
proach based on a new methodology in a certain sense restores the conclusions 
RIWKH+DUYDUGVFKRRO²DWOHDVWSDUWLDOO\$VDQH[DPSOHOHWXVUHFDOOWKHWKHRU\
RI YHUWLFDO UHVWUDLQWV7KH+DUYDUG VFKRRO TXDOL¿HG WKHPDV DZD\ WR VWUHQJWK-
en the producer’s monopolistic power on a related market. The antitrust cases 
used the approach of unlawfulness of agreements restricting competition per se. 
The authors of the Chicago school have demonstrated that exclusive contracts 
cannot restrict market entry and therefore market competition. A number of later 
(Post-Chicago) models show that the restriction of competition by vertical re-
strictive contracts is not an inevitable consequence but is nevertheless quite pos-
sible under certain circumstances.
From the perspective of the Post-Chicago approach, there are many agreements 
and actions, the effect of which does not allow their lawfulness or unlawfulness to 
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be presumed. An in-depth analysis of the conditions and expected consequences 
of the use of agreements is needed. From the perspective of the Austrian school, 
that approach is based on excessively optimistic attitude to obtaining and quali-
¿HGXVHRINQRZOHGJHLQGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ7KLVSDUWLFXODUSRVVLELOLW\LVGRXEWHG
E\WKH$XVWULDQV7KHUHLVDFRQÀLFWRILQWHUHVWIRUHDFKSDUW\LQWKHLQWHUSOD\RI
research programs. The reason is almost self-evident: the evaluation of oppor-
tunities to explain and predict depends crucially on the assumptions and tools 
implemented. This is the real challenge to overcome.
7. Conclusion
The answer to the question in the paper’s headline is in fact the answer of 
DQ ³LQIRUPHG RSWLPLVW´ ¿UPV¶ 6&$ DUH FORVHO\ UHODWHG WR G\QDPLF FDSDELOL-
ties, which in turn are necessary conditions for success in competition as a pro-
FHVV7KLV LV WKHFDVHEHFDXVH LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ DQG H[SORLWDWLRQRI QHZRSSRUWX-
nities for business is in fact another aspect of the discovery of new resources 
LQ WKH'&7VHQVHDVZHOODQG WKHGLVFRYHU\RIQHZZD\V WRXVHIDPLOLDU UH-
sources. At the same time, the closeness of the fundamentals of the two theories 
LVQRWVXI¿FLHQW IRU WKHLUPHUJHUDFFRUGLQJ WR WKHSULQFLSOHRIVLPSOHFRPSOH-
PHQWDULW\$(±PDUNHW'&7±WKH¿UP7KHPDLQREVWDFOHLVVWLOOWKHGLIIHUHQFH
in conceptual frameworks. 
7KHVLJQL¿FDQFHRI FRPSHWLWLRQ IRU HFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQW LV QRW GLVSXWDEOH
IRU$( RU FRPSHWLQJ1&( DQG QRZ²HVSHFLDOO\²1,( DV UHVHDUFK WUDGLWLRQV
Evolved and exploited dynamic capabilities are another side of competition in 
WHUPV RI ¿UPV¶ DFWLRQV DQG LQWHUDFWLRQ 7KHUH LV DFRPPRQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI
WKHQHHG WR SURWHFW FRPSHWLWLRQ +RZHYHU WKHFRPSHWLWLRQ SURWHFWLRQ PHWKRGV
XVHGLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKRVHDSSURDFKHVGLIIHUVLJQL¿FDQWO\GXHWRVHULRXVGLIIHU-
ences in the operational and conceptual interpretation of competition. At the same 
time, these methods are not invariant to content and ways to develop relevant 
dynamic capabilities.
According to AE, relevant information is generated and transferred precisely 
within the framework of competition as a process and is not available ex ante for 
agents, even for very experienced ones. In practice, this means that it is impossible 
to functionally use something that turns out to be an unforeseen and unintended 
result of interaction for the purposes of explaining an economic agent’s conduct. 
This is why it is inexpedient to consider competition on the basis of models where 
SULFLQJDQGRXWSXWGHFLVLRQVDUHPDGH7KHUHLVDQLPSRUWDQWLPSOLFDWLRQIRU'&7
LQWKHIRUPRIDTXHVWLRQZKHWKHUWKLVIDFWLVVRPHKRZUHÀHFWHGLQRUJDQL]DWLRQDO
FDSDELOLWLHVWRDGDSWDQGRULQÀXHQFHDORFDOUHJXODWRU\HQYLURQPHQW
To understand the content of competition from the perspective of AE, it is im-
portant to see the demarcation line between ignorance and knowledge, how it 
changes and how (or whether) differences in peoples’ alertness ensure the move-
ment of the economic system toward equilibrium. Unexpectedness, unpredict-
ability of particular competition results, both for politicians and for market ac-
tors themselves, are necessary conditions for skepticism of the very possibility 
WRSUHGLFWSURGXFWWHFKQRORJLFDODQGRUJDQL]DWLRQDOFKDQJHVLQGHWDLO+RZHYHU
WKLVGRHVQRWPHDQDQDEVHQFHRIRSSRUWXQLWLHVWRGHYHORSDQGVWXG\¿UPVSH-
FL¿FFDSDELOLWLHV WR LQLWLDWHDQGVXVWDLQ WKHVHFKDQJHVDVDZD\WRHQVXUH6&$
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In the world of structural uncertainty, dynamic capabilities might demonstrate 
advantages over capabilities that are in fact pseudo-dynamic.
+HQFHWKHUHLVVNHSWLFLVPFRQFHUQLQJWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIHQIRUFLQJQRUPVWRSUR-
tect competition by the state, on the one hand, and skepticism regarding opportuni-
ties to explain in advance and in detail the particular content of SCA in the system 
RI³YDOXHFUHDWLRQ²GLVWULEXWLRQUHQWVHHNLQJ´FRRUGLQDWHV7KLVVNHSWLFLVPLV
fully relevant for antitrust regulation as well. NIE, in turn, sees fewer grounds for 
government intervention under the pretext of restrictions of competition by market 
SOD\HUVFRPSDUHGWRWKH+DUYDUGVFKRRODVWKHEDVLVIRUDSSO\LQJDQWLWUXVWOHJLVOD-
tion, but does not fully deny antitrust policy opportunities. This is the fundamental 
difference between AE and NIE regarding the possibilities of competition policy.
The comparison of AE with NCE and NIE shows the difference in the views 
on the limits of the permissible in the activity of the government. For some type 
RIFDVHVWKHLQH[SHGLHQF\RIJRYHUQPHQWLQWHUYHQWLRQLVSUHVXPHG2QHH[DPSOH
is block exemptions as a particular form of the rule of reason. For other cases this 
presumption becomes imperative. It is for the reason of much greater proximity 
between AE and NIE as opposed to NCE that we might expect dramatic discus-
sions of the details of both competition and antitrust policy between the NIE and 
AE strands of economic thinking.
Antitrust policy is not an exception among other manifestations of government 
activity criticized by AE. Is this position regarding competition and antitrust pol-
icy a matter of faith or knowledge based on experience? The answer is as simple 
DVFRQGXFWLQJDGHFLVLYHH[SHULPHQWIROORZLQJ,PUH/DNDWRVIRUWKHSXUSRVHRI
establishing truth in rivalry of different research programs. In all likelihood, from 
the positive theory perspective, these approaches do not compete at all, because 
WKH\H[DPLQHGLIIHUHQWLVVXHV+RZHYHUHYHQLIWKLVLVWKHFDVHGLUHFWFRQWUDGLF-
tions in the regulatory sphere, especially in the normative context, are not only 
unavoidable but mostly evident.
Further discussion of the differences in the understanding of dynamic capabili-
ties, competition, competition policy frameworks and possibilities of different re-
search programs envisions the solution of an important methodological problem. 
In fact, this problem was highlighted at the very beginning of the article: a simpli-
¿HGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHHVVHQFHRIFRPSHWLQJFRQFHSWVFUHDWHVWKHJURXQGVIRU
discussion not with real intellectual opponents, but with phantoms on all sides 
of the discussion'HEDWLQJHDFKSDUWLFXODUSUREOHPLWLVQHFHVVDU\WRDJUHHRU
DW OHDVW FODULI\ WKHUHVLGXDO GLIIHUHQFHV RQ WKHFRQFHSWV XVHG DQG WKHLU GH¿QL-
WLRQV²LI QRW IURP DQRUPDWLYH SHUVSHFWLYH WKHQ DW OHDVW IURP DSRVLWLYH RQH
,WDOVREHFRPHVDFKDOOHQJHIRUWKHPHWKRGRORJ\RIHFRQRPLFVWR¿QGWRROVDQG
ways to transform the dialogue between the blind and the deaf to a dialogue be-
tween those who possess the power of speech and sight.
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